## T

#### T)

#### 1) We meet their interpretation. They can’t get offense based off of a violation that isn’t justified by their interpretation. We do defend the literal implementation of the plan.

#### 2) We don’t fiat a mindset shift. We have two solvency advocates- Bullard and Lazarus- that say siting nuclear power plants in non-minority communities would initiate a discussion. Our solvency is based on that discussion that happens, and forcing elites to take responsibility for their decisions through siting decisions. At worst it’s effects T, not extra T, but that isn’t what they are going for so you should punish them for making a bad call.

#### 3) We also defend writer activism, which is something that we can actually do as academics within this debate round. The debate is about whether imagining plan action is good or bad- that’s the Straume card in the 1AC. This is better for the neg- it generates more, predictable ground. This is especially true when they read a K of our methodology- we should be able to defend that methodology.

#### 4) They don’t give you a reason to vote neg that we don’t subsume. Hold them to the text of the interpretation.

## Case

#### Shell Bluff

#### Nuclear coming now

Wang 12 (Ucilia, Contributor @ Forbes, *Feds To Finance Small Nuclear Reactor Designs*, January 20th, http://www.forbes.com/sites/uciliawang/2012/01/20/feds-to-finance-small-nuclear-reactor-designs/)

The U.S. Department of Energy on Friday announced a plan to support the design of so-called “small modular nuclear reactors” and popularize their use for power generation.¶ The plan is **to fund** two reactor designs that will become available for licensing and production by 2022. The department is first asking for advice from the power industry on crafting the details of this project, and it hasn’t said how much it would dole out. But whoever wins the contracts to design the reactors will have to pony up money as well.¶ Small reactors are generally about one-third the size of existing nuclear reactors, and a power plant with small reactors promises to be cheaper to build and easier to obtain permits more quickly than a full-size nuclear power plant, proponents say. Utilities should have more flexibility in modifying the size of a power plant with small reactors – if they need more power, then they can add more reactors over time.¶ Nuclear reactors have historically been designed to be 1-gigawatt or more each because such scale helps to drive down the manufacturing and installation costs. Small reactors can be economical, too, advocates say, because they can be shipped more easily and cheaply around the world.¶ Energy Secretary Steve Chu has said he’s a big fan of small nuclear reactor technology.

#### Nuclear power displaces coal and helps alleviate mining concerns.

Cerafici ‘9

Tamar Jergensen Cerafici is an attorney whose practice focuses on the intersections between environmental and nuclear law. 40 Years and Counting: Relicensing the First Generation of Nuclear Power Plants: Is New Always Better? The Case for License Renewal in the Next Generation 26 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 391 Summer 2009

American utilities used 42.7 million pounds of U3O8 in 1998, but 83 percent of this was imported. Canada supplied 40 percent of uranium fuel used in the US, followed by Russia (13 percent), United States (12 percent), Australia (10 percent), and Uzbekistan (9 percent). The nuclear industry in the US often argues that nuclear power reduces imports of foreign oil, saving us money. In fact, very little oil is used for electricity generation and very little electricity is used for [\*410] transportation. Nuclear power displaces coal, not oil, and almost all coal used in the US comes from the US. Even more ironic, uranium fuel imports created a $ 362 million trade deficit in 1998. n68

Coal is worse for disadvantaged communities.

Endres ‘7

Danielle Endres Assistant Professor of Communication University of UtahThe State of Environmental Justice in High-Level Nuclear Waste Siting Decisions Paper presented at the State of Environmental Justice in America 2007 Conference Howard University School of Law

One important aspect of environmental justice and energy concerns oil, coal, and climate change. “The high correlation between petroleum basins and indigenous communities on every continent tells a story of increasing pressure on indigenous peoples and their homelands to feed the industrialized world’s growing appetite for oil and gas.”19 With the depletion of oil resources, the United States will see a resurgence of coal powered energy. Indeed, with the move to increase the use of coal power, the Peabody Coal company has plans to re-open their Black Mesa coal mine despite the protest of the Navajo nations.20 Moreover, there is new coal power plant, called the Desert Rock Power Plant, to be located on Navajo lands.21 In addition to these mines and plants, those living in the vicinity of other mines and plants are disproportionately members of marginalized communities. Climate change, the result of using oil and coal, will also excessively affect the poor and people of color. “The adverse affects [of global warming] will fall disproportionately on the poor, including the people of color in the United States who are concentrated in urban centers in the South, coastal regions, and areas with substandard air quality.” 22 The effects of climate change will unduly hurt poor and people of color, who often lack insurance, with increased heat-related deaths, impacts of floods (e.g., think of Hurricane Katrina), more droughts, toxic smog that will intensify asthma rates in urban areas, and fires.23 Overall, Robert D. Bullard, Glenn S. Johnson, and Angel O. Torres argue that “Global climate change looms as a major environmental justice issue of the twenty-first century…As we search for ways to rectify global climate change, we desperately need the input of the populations most likely to be negatively affected: people of color and other poor people in the North and in the developing countries of the South.”24 Citing the imperative to stop global climate change, some argue that the United States should shift to nuclear power.25 However, nuclear power also raises issues of both environmental justice and danger to the health of humans and the environment from uranium mining and milling, the possibility of accidents, and the storage of nuclear waste.26 In order to understand the differences between coal, oil, and nuclear power in regard to environmental justice, it is important to understand the concerns related to each type of energy production and use. In this paper, I focus the environmental justice implications of nuclear waste storage. This information, combined with detailed information about the other aspects of environmental justice in oil, coal, and nuclear power, can give us the needed information to make choices about which energy sources to use. This paper therefore adds one argument to the larger conversations about energy policy and environmental justice.

#### Loan guarantees reduce risks and make nuclear viable

New Millenium Nuclear Energy Partnership 12

(The New Millennium Nuclear Energy Summit was held on December 7, 2010, in Wash- ington, D.C. Senior leaders from government, industry and non-government organizations actively participated in defining the most important and substantive issues that confront the nuclear energy industry—an essential part of the United States’ energy production portfolio. Upon the success of the summit, four working groups comprised of summit participants were established to provide the recommendations found in this consolidated report. June 2012, “A Strategy for the Future of Nuclear Energy: The Consolidated Working Group Report” http://content.thirdway.org/publications/540/Third\_Way\_Report\_-\_A\_Strategy\_for\_the\_Future\_of\_Nuclear\_Energy.pdf)

Power plant investments can be risky, even with established technologies. These risks can lead to significant economic losses that must be allocated among the project’s partners, investors, suppliers, vendors, and customers. If the project is directly owned by the corporate parent, or a partnership of such parents, the liabilities of such risks may be unacceptably large. This is particularly true for capital projects as large as nuclear power plants, which outweigh the market value of most modern energy companies. For example, the largest U.S. utility/power generation company has a market capitalization of $40 billion, and most are less than $10 billion. The small size of U.S. companies relative to the large infrastructure projects such as for new nuclear reactors makes such projects extremely challenging. There are many differences between regulated and merchant markets, but the basic problems of the high up-front capital costs and financial risks of nuclear energy facilities (compared to the cost and financial risks of other sources) make nuclear energy development challenging in both business models. In merchant markets, these characteristics make it difficult for investors to expect a nuclear project to earn enough revenue to cover its relatively high up-front capital costs and the financial risk premiums that will be required to build it. In regulated markets, these same characteristics make it difficult for investors to expect the energy company’s economic regulator to approve the full cost of a new nuclear project. Accordingly, federal policies to reduce the effective cost and financial risks of new nuclear projects and ease cash flow burdens during construction should be effective in both business models. Such policies should create oppor- tunities to reduce the risk of nuclear projects through effective project manage- ment and avoid shifting risk to taxpayers. An important role for government assistance to the private sector in obtain- ing financing and managing the costs for the initial wave of new reactors is through loan guarantees like those authorized in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. The future owner of the nuclear facility pays the premium for these government “insurance policies,” which helps mitigate the perceived risk by the financial community of project failures and can reduce the overall capital investment required by the private sector by reducing the cost of financing (e.g., interest rates). This government action leverages major investments by private industry to provide clean, safe, and reliable energy as demonstrated by today’s operating fleet of power-generating reactors. Recommendations • • • The Administration and Congress should assert their continued commit- ment to nuclear energy loan guarantees. Put simply, this is a key enabling path for financing of nuclear projects on reasonable terms, particularly for larger projects. Government support through this financing regimen is impor- tant since it is clearly in the national interest to create additional safe, clean, and reliable energy. The Administration should develop transparent criteria for establishing credit costs for loan guarantees. The credit subsidy costs associated with the loan guarantee program vary widely. Recent applicants have found that the criteria for determining the credit subsidy cost are neither well established nor transparent. Such criteria should be developed jointly by government and industry—or at the very least should be made clear to the applicant companies—and should reflect the actual risk to the government. The loan guarantee program should shift to industry after a pool of new plants is built. After a sufficient number of new nuclear reactors have come online, the U.S. should no longer bear the risk of default. Rather, the loan guarantee program should transition from the government to the pool of new nuclear energy plant owners. As an example, assuming 20 new plants comprise a large enough guarantee pool, the owners of the first 20 plants enabled by government loan guarantees could be required to collectively provide a loan guarantee to the 21st plant. These 21 plants could be re- quired to provide a loan guarantee to the 22nd plant, and so on. This would, in effect, transfer the risk of subsequent projects’ defaults from the taxpayer to the nuclear industry.

## CP

#### Perm, do both

#### CP is just the status quo – we already do EISs and HIAs for nuclear power, and know that the risk associated with them is marginal. But only people in high-income areas have the resources to keep plants out of their neighborhoods.

#### The people in control of how HIAs and EISs are conducted are the people who live in high-income neighborhoods. CP incentivizes them to manipulate the results to say it’s unsafe just to keep them out of their neighborhoods.

#### Engagement DA – doing a health impact assessment is a way to assuage people’s fears without forcing them to embrace the risk associated with plants. We know that any risk associated with nuclear power is marginal, but currently only low-income areas are asked to take that risk. This means in the world of the counterplan, either 1 – the EIS says nuclear power is safe and people in high-income neighborhoods get the plants without confronting risk that Butler talks about, or 2 – the EIS says nuclear power isn’t safe and we just continue building power plants in low-income neighborhoods where they’re already getting built, making the social invisibility Szentes talks about by reaffirming the notion that it’s ok to place dangerous plants in low-income areas.

#### The NRC process is supposed to account for environmental justice concerns.

Blais ‘96

Lynn E. Blais Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Texas at Austin School of Law ARTICLE: Environmental Racism Reconsidered 75 N.C.L. Rev. 75 Nov. 1996

While NEPA requires agencies to assess the impacts of a proposed action and determine whether those impacts are significant, the Executive Order seeks consideration of "environmental justice implications only when the disparate environmental impacts are 'high and adverse.'" n40 The process endorsed by the Commission [\*196] for identification of environmental justice concerns consists of: a) identification of minority and low income populations, and b) determining whether there are disproportionately high and adverse impacts on those populations. n41 Absent a claim to the contrary, the environmental justice considerations of NEPA are not pertinent. n42 Once the threshold for conducting an in-depth environmental justice review is exceeded, the precise demographics of a given area are not critical; instead, the focus of the environmental justice review shifts to assessing the impacts on the minority populations. n43 When an EIS correctly identifies "minority populations" and conducts an in-depth environmental justice review, the agencies NEPA responsibilities are satisfied. n44 Since the purpose of identifying the low-income and minority populations is to aid in assessing potentially significant impacts to those communities, whether an area is defined as low-income or minority is effectively inconsequential as long as the review ultimately considers impacts unique to those communities. In an EIS, once the agency acknowledges the need to do an environmental justice analysis, the review shifts focus to an assessment of the impacts to a low-income population rather than concentrating on formulating ever more precise census statistics. Under NEPA, the purpose of the environmental justice review is "to become aware of the demographic and economic circumstances of local communities where nuclear facilities are to be sited, and take care to mitigate or avoid special impacts attributable to the special character of the community." n45 Thus, the focus of the environmental justice review should be on "identifying and weighing disproportionately significant and adverse environmental impacts on minority and low-income populations that may be different from the impacts on the general population." n46 Thus, a party challenging the adequacy of an EIS must describe a nexus between the effect on minority and low-income populations and the specific environmental harm.

## K

#### Perm, do both

**Perm, do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative**

#### Perm solves- the end of the word is an act of complete pessimism, reconciliation and hope are key to solve.

John B. Hatch, Assistant Professor of Communication at the University of Dubuque, Rhetoric and Public Affairs, 2006

If substantial and widespread racial reconciliation is ever to occur, then, its advocates must continue to employ a rhetoric of hope and faith. As McPhail laments, believing that whites collectively will take adequate responsibility for their racial history after the evidence of the past five centuries requires "a major leap of faith, the same leap of faith that has historically sustained African American rhetorical practices and theories." [50](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v009/9.2hatch.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT50) Perhaps reconciliation's rhetoric, which is gaining a wider hearing today than in the past, is what is needed to renew such flagging faith. Indeed, Doxtader has called reconciliation "a working faith in the works of words." **[51](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v009/9.2hatch.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT51)** It is also a rhetoric of hope, **[52](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v009/9.2hatch.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT52)** calling forth the power to jointly fashion public goods that do not yet exist—in part by presupposing their reality at some deeper level. Doxtader's statement that reconciliation's comic motives (as I have explicated them) "seem to presuppose a bit of what they are intended to create," **[53](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v009/9.2hatch.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT53)** while meant as a warning, surely identifies reconciliation's promise as well. Much of the theology of reconciliation draws on the ontological assumption that goodness is more fundamental than evil. Absent such a rhetoric of faith and hope, would Tutu or Mandela have even attempted to bring about reconciliation in South Africa? And does the idea of black reparations for slavery have a chance to gain a hearing, without a hopeful rhetoric of reconciliation? Yet hope is only of value to the extent that it ultimately galvanizes action to transform reality. And the reality of race in America remains largely tragic for blacks, while many whites seem to have their heads in the color-blind clouds. There are glimmers of hope to help reconciliation's proponents keep the faith, such as Brooks's innovative proposal, which infuses the hope of healing into a call for reparations, and the Senate's recent apology for its past record of having blocked anti-lynching legislation until 1968, [54](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v009/9.2hatch.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT54) an act of redress that sets a precedent for making a slavery apology. However, as Doxtader warns, the comic promise of reconciliation's horizon may not be enough to turn the beneficiaries of oppression back on themselves to question the grounds of their identity (and prosperity). The tragic reality of unequal and conflictual race relations might have to go from bad to worse before reconciliation's call to atonement becomes compelling. In other words, Wilson's second option for making reconciliation viable remains a troublingly live one: "Reconciliation also might have a chance if the United States entered a period of crisis that [End Page 271] threatened the systems that maintain racially disparate power relations." [55](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v009/9.2hatch.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT55) One can only hope that whites, as well as blacks and the American public as a whole, will recognize reconciliation's kairos in this generation without having to experience some form of social chaos first.

**Case outweighs and solves the K-**

**They assume that all risk is the same, and all of the people facing risks face them identically. The consequences may be dire for many communities, but that doesn’t mean they all want to face them the same way. The aff allows people to choose the pragmatic fights that they want and need to win through community involvement.**

#### ADDITIONALLY \_ Normalized and invisible forms of violence are easily ignored as we demand a revolution or end of the world- it glosses over the experience of people that fall outside their one-size-fits-all approach to identity, such as black political elites or people living in siting areas currently protesting against power plants. The K requires that acts of discrimination that cannot be perfectly understood as stemming from anti-blackness remain invisible to claim solvency. Nixon, Szentes and the SH ev from the 1AC indicate that their denial not only makes it impossible to completely explain the discriminatory siting process of the SQ but also makes genocide, war, and the “last and final catastrophe” inevitable.

#### Alt fails –Their pessimism just results in complicity in oppression. They are just the opposite site of the coin from people who say that state action is always necessary and that the government should control everything. Newman says overcoming of one evil is always the imposition of a new, worse regime. The perm is a form of agonism, recognizing the problems with the institution, and embracing that we can never completely overcome those problems, but should constantly work towards making things better.

**If they don’t force elites to take responsibility for their decisions, they don’t close the neoliberal distance and only ensures that elites are able to abjectify entire populations.**

#### Even if they claim not to abandon the state in it’s totality – this is NOT the same as engaging the state in the debate space. NEWMAN and DERRIDA both contend that institutional engagement is crucial to changing the institutions and to spurring the most productive forms of resistance. Challenging controversial siting decisions through the lens of neoliberalism accounts for the risk calculus that is currently understood as neutral. This cannot be accomplished without discussing NRC policy. This unique agonism created by challenging the institutions that create discrimination provides the best mechanism for addressing violence.

#### ---Straume

#### Addressing problems created by political institutions is the best way to challenge anti-blackness. Without learning about the institutional and historical context of discriminations, college students are politically ignorant and lack civic agency.

Bush ‘11

Melanie, Associate Professor and Chair, Anthropology & Sociology @ Adelphi University, Everyday Forms of Whiteness: Understanding Race in a “Post-Racial” World, p. 235-236

Carol Geary Schneider, president of the Association of American Colleges and Universities, has been quoted as saying, "Very few courses in the contemporary undergraduate curriculum directly address democratic principles and/or aspirations" (Schneider 1999, 9). She further asked where in the curriculum are students engaged about concepts of justice, democracy, equality, opportunity, and liberty and suggested that these challenging topics belong in general education because they are integral dimensions of American pluralism and must be understood in the context of their historical connections(Schneider 1999, 9). This engagement is central to the development of civic responsibility and social awareness as a core tenet of higher education. While most of the work on civic engagement does not speak to the issues of involvement in political projects or the world of social movements, the history of democracy in the United States alone and certainly globally is one that situates these activities squarely within the realm of liberal education and civic engagement. This may be avoided out of concern for partisanship, because of a perception that service is good, activism is problematic or is a result of efforts to sustain the status quo. Regardless of the reason, it is important to note the significant value that comes from political involvement especially aimed not only on raising awareness or affecting individuals, but also toward structural change(Bush and Little 2009). Learning about political institutions**,** issues, contexts, and practices should be an integral part of that enterprise(liberal arts education). College graduates cannot make sense of their environment and their place in it if they are politically ignorant, unskilled, and lacking in a sense of civic agency, the sense that they can work with others to solve problems that concern them—in their communities, workplaces**,** .. ." (Colby 2008: 8 ) Overall, every opportunity to advance a broad-based and deepened understanding about the global dynamics of white supremacy, including its material impact on the lives of all people, should be pursued. This effort couldcultivate a counter narrative that deals with white racism from "cradle to grave."29 It can also provide incentive tothe large numbers of white peopleoutside the ruling class, whose acceptance of the status quo contributes to the entrenchment of the patterns of racial inequality and injustice that threaten our future, **to** perhaps **redefine their allegiances** and reconfigure their notion of "who's to blame."

#### Wilderson’s method is flawed

#### a. US-centricity

Bâ (teaches film at Portsmouth University (UK). He researches ‘race’, the ‘postcolonial’,  diaspora,  the  transnational  and  film  ‘genre’,  African  and  Caribbean cinemas  and film festivals) 11

(Saër Maty, The US Decentred, Cultural Studies Review, volume 17 number 2 September 2011)

A few pages into Red, White and Black, I feared that it would just be a matter of time before Wilderson’s black‐as‐social‐death idea and multiple attacks on issues and scholars he disagrees with run (him) into (theoretical) trouble. This happens in chapter two, ‘The Narcissistic Slave’, where he critiques black film theorists and books. For example, Wilderson declares that Gladstone Yearwood’s Black Film as Signifying Practice (2000) ‘betrays a kind of conceptual anxiety with respect to the historical object of study— ... it clings, anxiously, to the film‐as‐text‐as‐legitimate‐ object of Black cinema.’ (62) He then quotes from Yearwood’s book to highlight ‘just how vague the aesthetic foundation of Yearwood’s attempt to construct a canon can be’. (63) And yet Wilderson’s highlighting is problematic because it overlooks the ‘Diaspora’ or ‘African Diaspora’, a key component in Yearwood’s thesis that, crucially, neither navel‐gazes (that is, at the US or black America) nor pretends to properly engage with black film. Furthermore, Wilderson separates the different waves of black film theory and approaches them, only, in terms of how a most recent one might challenge its precedent. Again, his approach is problematic because it does not mention or emphasise the inter‐connectivity of/in black film theory. As a case in point, Wilderson does not link Tommy Lott’s mobilisation of Third Cinema for black film theory to Yearwood’s idea of African Diaspora. (64) Additionally, of course, Wilderson seems unaware that Third Cinema itself has been fundamentally questioned since Lott’s 1990s’ theory of black film was formulated. Yet another consequence of ignoring the African Diaspora is that it exposes Wilderson’s corpus of films as unable to carry the weight of the transnational argument he attempts to advance. Here, beyond the US‐centricity or ‘social and political specificity of [his] filmography’, (95) I am talking about Wilderson’s choice of films. For example, Antwone Fisher (dir. Denzel Washington, 2002) is attacked unfairly for failing to acknowledge ‘a grid of captivity across spatial dimensions of the Black “body”, the Black “home”, and the Black “community”’ (111) while films like Alan and Albert Hughes’s Menace II Society (1993), overlooked, do acknowledge the same grid and, additionally, problematise Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (STEP) policing. The above examples expose the fact of Wilderson’s dubious and questionable conclusions on black film. Red, White and Black is particularly undermined by Wilderson’s propensity for exaggeration and blinkeredness. In chapter nine, ‘“Savage” Negrophobia’, he writes: The philosophical anxiety of Skins is all too aware that through the Middle Passage, African culture became Black ‘style’ ... Blackness can be placed and displaced with limitless frequency and across untold territories, by whoever so chooses. Most important, there is nothing real Black people can do to either check or direct this process ... Anyone can say ‘nigger’ because anyone can be a ‘nigger’. (235)7 Similarly, in chapter ten, ‘A Crisis in the Commons’, Wilderson addresses the issue of ‘Black time’. Black is irredeemable, he argues, because, at no time in history had it been deemed, or deemed through the right historical moment and place. In other words, the black moment and place are not right because they are ‘the ship hold of the Middle Passage’: ‘the most coherent temporality ever deemed as Black time’ but also ‘the “moment” of no time at all on the map of no place at all’. (279) Not only does Pinho’s more mature analysis expose this point as preposterous (see below), I also wonder what Wilderson makes of the countless historians’ and sociologists’ works on slave ships, shipboard insurrections and/during the Middle Passage,8 or of groundbreaking jazz‐studies books on cross‐cultural dialogue like The Other Side of Nowhere (2004). Nowhere has another side, but once Wilderson theorises blacks as socially and ontologically dead while dismissing jazz as ‘belonging nowhere and to no one, simply there for the taking’, (225) there seems to be no way back. It is therefore hardly surprising that Wilderson ducks the need to provide a solution or alternative to both his sustained bashing of blacks and anti‐ Blackness.9 Last but not least, Red, White and Black ends like a badly plugged announcement of a bad Hollywood film’s badly planned sequel: ‘How does one deconstruct life? Who would benefit from such an undertaking? The coffle approaches with its answers in tow.’ (340)

#### b. Non-falsifiablility

#### His unverifiable generalizations are understandable because he relies on Lacanian and Marxist structuralism – We’ll quote Wilderson’s method section

Wilderson 10

A Note on Method

Throughout this book I use White, Human, Master, Settler, and sometimes non‑Black interchangeably to connote a paradigmatic entity that exists ontologically as a position of life in relation to the Black or Slave position, one of death. The Red, Indigenous, or "Savage" position exists liminally as half‑death and half‑life between the Slave (Black) and the Human (White, or non‑Black). I capitalize the words Red, White, Black, Slave, Savage, and Human in order to assert their importance as ontological positions and to stress the value of theorizing power politically rather than culturally. I want to move from a politics of culture to a culture of politics (as I argue in chapter a). Capitalizing these words is consistent with my argument that the array of identities that they contain is important but inessential to an analysis of the paradigm of power in which they are positioned. Readers wedded to cultural diversity and historical specificity may find such shorthand wanting. But those who may be put off by my pressing historical and cultural particularities‑culled from history, sociology, and cultural studies, yet neither historical, sociological, nor, oddly enough, cultural‑should bear in mind that there are precedents for such methods, two of which make cultural studies and much of social science possible: the methods of Karl Marx and Jacques Lacan. Marx pressed the microcosm of the English manufacturer into the service of a project that sought to explain economic relationality on a global scale. Lacan's exemplary cartography was even smaller: a tiny room with not much more than a sofa and a chair, the room of the psychoanalytic encounter. As Jonathan Lee reminds us, at stake in Lacan's account of the psychoanalytic encounter is the realization of subjectivity itself, "the very being of the subject. "31 I argue that "Savage' Human, and Slave should be theorized in the way we theorize worker and capitalist as positions first and as identities second, or as we theorize capitalism as a paradigm rather than as an experience‑that is, before they take on national origin or gendered specfficity Throughout the course of this book I argue that "Savage' Human, and Slave are more essential to our understanding of the truth of institutionality than the positions from political or libidinal economy. For in this trio we find the key to our world's creation as well as to its undoing. This argument, as it relates to political economy, continues in chapter i, "The Ruse of Analogy:' In chapter 2, "The Narcissistic Slave," I shift focus from political economy to libidinal economy before undertaking more concrete analyses of films in parts 2, 3, and 4.

 No one makes films and declares their own films "Human" while simultaneously asserting that other films (Red and Black) are not Human cinema. Civil society represents itself to itself as being infinitely inclusive, and its technologies of hegemony (including cinema) are mobilized to manufacture this assertion, not to dissent from it. In my quest to interrogate the bad faith of the civic "invitation;' I have chosen White cinema as the sine qua non of Human cinema. Films can be thought of as one of an ensemble of discursive practices mobilized by civil society to "invite:' or interpellate, Blacks to the same variety of social identities that other races are able to embody without contradiction, identities such as worker, soldier, immigrant, brother, sister, father, mother, and citizen. The bad faith of this invitation, this faux interpeLlation, can be discerned by deconstructing the way cinema's narrative strategies displace our consideration and understanding of the ontological status of Blacks (social death) onto a series of fanciful stories that are organized around conflicts which are the purview only of those who are not natally alienated, generally dishonored, or open to gratuitous violence, in other words, people who are White or colored but who are not Black. (I leave aside, for the moment, the liminality of the Native American position‑oscillating as it does between the living and the dead.)

Immigrant cinema of those who are not White would have sufficed as well; but, due to its exceptional capacity to escape racial markers, Whiteness is the most impeccable embodiment of what it means to be Human. As Richard Dyer writes, "Having no content, we [White people] can't see that we have anything that accounts for our position of privilege and power . . . . The equation of being white with being human secures a position of power:' He goes on to explain how "the privilege of being white... is not to be subjected to stereotyping in relation to one's whiteness. 'White people are stereotyped in terms of gender, nation, class, sexuality, ability and so on, but the overt point of such typification is gender, nation, etc. Whiteness generally colonises the stereotypical definition of all social categories other than those of race.'

Unlike Dyer, I do not meditate on the representational power of Whiteness, "that it be made strange:' divested of its imperial capacity, and thus make way for representational practices in cinema and beyond that serve as aesthetic accompaniments for a more egalitarian civil society in which Whites and non‑Whites could live in harmony. Laudable as that dream is, I do not share Dyer's assumption that we are all Human. Some of us are only part Human ("Savage") and some of us are Black (Slave). I find his argument that Whiteness possesses the easiest claim to Humanness to be productive. But whereas Dyer offers this argument as a lament for a social ill that needs to be corrected, I borrow it merely for its explanatory power‑as a way into a paradigmatic analysis that clarifies structural relations of global antagonisms and not as a step toward healing the wounds of social relations in civil society. Hence this book's interchangeable deployment of White, Settler, and Master with‑and to signify‑Human. Again, like Lacan, who mobilizes the psychoanalytic encounter to make claims about the structure of relations writ large, and like Marx, who mobilizes the English manufacturer to make claims about the structure of economic relations writ large, I am mobilizing three races, four films, and one subcontinent to make equally generalizable claims and argue that the antagonism between Black and Human supercedes the "antagonism" between worker and capitalist in political economy, as well as the gendered "antagonism" in libidinal economy. To this end, this book takes stock of how socially engaged popular cinema participates in the systemic violence that constructs America as a "settler society" (Churchill) and "slave estate" (Spilers). Rather than privilege a politics of culture(s)‑that is, rather than examine and accept the cultural gestures and declarations which the three groups under examination make about themselves‑1 privilege a culture of politics: in other words, what I am concerned with is how White film, Black film, and Red film articulate and disavow the matrix of violence which constructs the three essential positions which in turn structure US. antagonisms.

#### Psychonalysis pre-determines the social world in advance – produces a metaphysics that ensures replication of domination

Robinson (PhD Political Theory, University of Nottingham) 05

(Theory and Event, Andrew, 8:1, The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique)

One of the functions of myth is to cut out what Trevor Pateman terms the "middle level" of analytical concepts, establishing a short-circuit between high-level generalizations and ultra-specific (pseudo-) concrete instances.  In Barthes's classic case of an image of a black soldier saluting the French flag, this individual action is implicitly connected to highly abstract concepts such as nationalism, without the mediation of the particularities of his situation.  (These particularities, if revealed, could undermine the myth.  Perhaps he enlisted for financial reasons, or due to threats of violence).  Thus, while myths provide an analysis of sorts, their basic operation is anti-analytical: the analytical schema is fixed in advance, and the relationship between this schema and the instances it organizes is hierarchically ordered to the exclusive advantage of the former.  This is precisely what happens in Lacanian analyses of specific political and cultural phenomena.  Žižek specifically advocates 'sweeping generalizations' and short-cuts between specific instances and high-level abstractions, evading the "middle level".  'The correct dialectical procedure... can be best described as a direct jump from the singular to the universal, bypassing the mid-level of particularity'.  He wants a 'direct jump from the singular to the universal', without reference to particular contexts.

#### c. Ahistorical

#### They assume that anti-black animus arises from nothingness but it’s caught up in a broader web of historical power relationships like Islamophobia and nativism

Charoenying (citing Nelson Maldonado-Torres, Prof of Ethnic Studies, UC Berkeley) 8

(Timothy, Islamophobia & Anti-Blackness: A Genealogical Approach, http://crg.berkeley.edu/content/islamophobia-anti-blackness-genealogical-approach)

The year 1492 marked a major  turning point in the trajectory of Western Civilization. Elementary age children are taught this as the year Columbus famously crossed the Atlantic. An equally significant event that year, was the Spanish conquest of al-Andalus–a Moorish province on the southern Iberian peninsula established eight centuries earlier–and more importantly, the last major Muslim stronghold on the European continent. Critical race scholars have argued that these two events would not only shift the geopolitical balance of power from the Orient to the Occident, but fundamentally alter conceptions about religious and racial identity. According to Nelson Maldonado-Torres, of the University of California, Berkeley, the expulsion of the Moors from continental Europe marked a transition from an age of imperial relations between Christian and Muslim empires, to an age of European colonial expansion throughout the known world. The “discovery” of “godless” natives in the Americas would also inspire the great debates between Las Casas and Sepúlveda in 1550 on the nature of the human soul. Such a geopolitical and philosophical shift, Maldonado-Torres argues, would lead to a Eurocentric, re-categorization of humanity based upon religous—and ultimately racial—differences. Maldonado-Torres has proposed that anti-black racism is not simply an extension of some historical bias against blacks, but rather, is an amalgam of old-world Islamophobia linked to the history of the Iberian peninsula, and to the notion of souless beings embodied in popular  conceptions about the indigenous natives of the Americas. These beliefs would contribute to an ideological basis for, and justification of, colonial conquests in the name of cultural and religious conversion, as well as pave the way for the enslavement and human trafficking of sub-Saharan Africans.

#### Wilderson’s hard ontological descriptions make fatalism inevitable.

Bâ (teaches film at Portsmouth University (UK). He researches ‘race’, the ‘postcolonial’,  diaspora,  the  transnational  and  film  ‘genre’,  African  and  Caribbean cinemas  and film festivals) 11

(Saër Maty, The US Decentred, Cultural Studies Review, volume 17 number 2 September 2011)

In chapter nine, ‘“Savage” Negrophobia’, he writes: The philosophical anxiety of Skins is all too aware that through the Middle Passage, African culture became Black ‘style’ ... Blackness can be placed and displaced with limitless frequency and across untold territories, by whoever so chooses. Most important, there is nothing real Black people can do to either check or direct this process ... Anyone can say ‘nigger’ because anyone can be a ‘nigger’. (235)7 Similarly, in chapter ten, ‘A Crisis in the Commons’, Wilderson addresses the issue of ‘Black time’. Black is irredeemable, he argues, because, at no time in history had it been deemed, or deemed through the right historical moment and place. In other words, the black moment and place are not right because they are ‘the ship hold of the Middle Passage’: ‘the most coherent temporality ever deemed as Black time’ but also ‘the “moment” of no time at all on the map of no place at all’. (279) Not only does Pinho’s more mature analysis expose this point as preposterous (see below), I also wonder what Wilderson makes of the countless historians’ and sociologists’ works on slave ships, shipboard insurrections and/during the Middle Passage,8 or of groundbreaking jazz‐studies books on cross‐cultural dialogue like The Other Side of Nowhere (2004). Nowhere has another side, but once Wilderson theorises blacks as socially and ontologically dead while dismissing jazz as ‘belonging nowhere and to no one, simply there for the taking’, (225) there seems to be no way back. It is therefore hardly surprising that Wilderson ducks the need to provide a solution or alternative to both his sustained bashing of blacks and anti‐ Blackness.9 Last but not least, Red, White and Black ends like a badly plugged announcement of a bad Hollywood film’s badly planned sequel: ‘How does one deconstruct life? Who would benefit from such an undertaking? The coffle approaches with its answers in tow.’ (340)

#### Failure to repoliticize the economy will result in elite takeover of public institutions – effectively neutralizing the potential to check neoliberal economic policy

Dulci, 2k9

[Otavio Soares, sociologist and political scientist and is a professor in international relations at PUC-Minas, *Economics and Politics in the Global Crisis*, Estud. Av. Vol.23 Sao Paulo, 2009]

The latter returned in a recycled manner, presented as an alternative to the crisis of the State. The scale tipped toward the market. **The principle of depoliticization of the economy gained space and was made concrete in the privatization initiatives**, **deregulation and reduction of government role** (as well as of its size and cost). **But the handling of political resources**, **the means of control and power**, **was essential for all of this to take place**. Only through ideological credulity could it be said that the market would recover its function as a spontaneous skeleton of social life. From the time period suggested above, we could infer that the neoliberal globalization project was affirmed dialectically, through confrontations against internal antagonists (unions, civil servants, social movements) or external ones (the communist block and later the terrorist networks and the “Axis of Evil”), nourished by constant mobilization against real or manufactured enemies. **The hegemony of financial capitalism could only be achieved by political means**, **through the opportune management of power resources**. This can be demonstrated by a study of the relations between economic and political elites in several countries. **The image of a “revolving door” has been used to portray the constant circulation of members of the elites through government positions and private companies**. **Such interchange is notorious in the financial field and affects the governability of the system**, **as the current crisis has made clear**. **Perhaps this reality is what could be expected from a “less government**, **more market” movement**, **meaning less power to the public bureaucracy and more power to business**, **bankers and private managers in general**. It does make sense as long as the responsibilities are properly shared. **Hegemony**, to recall Gramsci, **is intellectual and moral leadership**. **For this reason**, **one of the principal consequences of the crisis is that the absolute power of financial capital has been put into question**. Capitalism as a system is not at risk, but **the banks**, **investment institutions**, **risk analysis agencies and all of the paraphernalia that developed around them**, **have lost clout**. **To rebuild their reputation**, **the banks and financial market agents will have to reestablish their primordial function as support for the real economy**. This is a normative proposition but has a practical side, given that the big international banks are not able to confront the crisis without government help. **Therefore**, **they must submit to certain political conditions**. The governments, representing public opinion, demand greater transparency and management austerity, given the revelations of huge salaries, benefits and gratifications bestowed on the administrators of banks and institutions on the brink of insolvency. A true salary bubble was revealed, which was not linked to reality. Even worse, it was not tied to the interests of the companies themselves, which were paying dearly for those who led them to the abyss for short term gains. **Nothing could be farther from the puritan ethic that justified capitalism**. **With the government rescue of banks and companies**, **the principle of separation between the ec onomy and politics was broken**. In other words, **governments** once again **came to participate directly in the game**, **and in a strong position**. Even if this is seen as an emergency measure, **it is a situation that moves the pendulum toward the State**, **as occurred in the crisis that began in 1929**. Is it possible that we are facing the end of an era, as in the 1930s? he comparison between the two crises has been frequent, and not by chance. The causes of both events were quite similar. The direction of the process has also followed the same course, from the center to the periphery of the world capitalist system. Both began in the financial arena and extended to the real economy. Or, according to the suggestive expression used in U.S. debate, the crisis began on Wall Street and spread to Main Street, where the common citizens live. Nevertheless, the world was very different 80 years ago. It was more rural and provincial than today. Many of the current countries were still colonies. Trade was more limited, and the scale of transactions relatively modest. The international division of labor distinguished the few industrial countries from the others, which sold agricultural products or minerals and purchased manufactured goods. In any case, the political and social consequences of the crash of 1929 are worth considering. They were of broad scope. **There was a collapse in the belief in liberal values and in a world guided by the self-regulated market**. **In its place**, as we indicated before, active, **interventionist governments asserted themselves**, varying from moderate to deep intervention and even total intervention (totalitarianism). The central values of the 1930s were the strong state, nationalism, racism, corporativism, the command economy and widespread politicization of social life. Due to the economic crisis, countries became more insulated. Each attempted to survive on its own. Trade and exchange declined. The international order was compromised, the arms race expanded and a solution for global disorder was only achieved at the end of a long world war which cost millions of lives. The only positive balance was the emphasis on the social question. Although in many cases (as in Brazil), that advance replaced a constructive approach to the question of democracy. T he most ominous political consequences of that time – dictatorships and war – do not seem probable, at least in the short term. Nevertheless, xenophobia and racial pressures cannot be discarded. They are already manifest in ethnic conflicts in Europe and other continents, and could be aggravated by the unemployment generated by the economic crisis. Barriers to immigration could certainly be tightened, and, in any case, the exodus of the poor towards the rich countries is not likely in times of want. If the flow is inverted, and immigrants return home, how will they be re-integrated, and what are the consequences of the lost flow of foreign currency which immigrants had sent from abroad? In the Central American countries, for example, those resources represent an important portion of national income. In the economic arena, there are certain analogies that are not surprising. One impulse similar to that found in the Depression is protectionism. The initial U.S. measures to confront the economic crisis, for example, displayed a tendency to treat it as an internal problem that did not involve the rest of the world. Their autism was revealed in the congressional attempts to introduce protective “buy American” clauses in the Obama government’s large public spending package. Of course broad reactions from abroad led legislators to review the package – particularly because the U.S. has often made open market demands on other countries. In situations such as that which the world is undergoing, there is a broad call for governments to act quickly and decisively, looking only inwards. Even so, **it is important to indicate that the best alternative to overcome the crisis is represented by coordinated measures**, **instead of each country for himself efforts**. **Unlike 1929**, **there is now an embryo of global governance composed of multilateral entities and government forums** (particularly G-20), **which are capable of promoting the search for joint solutions**. **Insofar as the various interests and needs are placed on the agenda**, **we have a chance to advance in a constructive direction**. **This would mean**, among other things, **focusing on production and labor more than on financial capitalism and on unchecked rent seeking**, **and also to approach the planet’s environmental challenges**. **A crisis involves risks**, **but also creates opportunities**. **The current crisis curbed the “irrational exuberance” of globalized capitalism and the unsustainable pace of consumption and use of resources which**, **as we well know**, **are not unlimited**. **The opportunity to rethink this route is essential and cannot be lost**.

#### Economistic coding of the environment ensures extinction- their obsession with economic logic ensures that overconsumption patterns remained unchallenged and that innovation pushes unsustainable growth- that’s also a disad to their truth claims

Weiskel ‘97 (Harvard Seminar on Environmental Values) (Timothy C., 6 July 1997, Selling Pigeons in the Temple: The Danger of Market Metaphors in an Ecosystem, <http://ecojustice.net/coffin/ops-008.htm>)

The natural order of the world and our role within it is affirmed by market enthusiasts and politicians alike to be an inevitable manifestation of the ongoing logic of an economy of unending, capitalist accumulation. In recent electoral history, politicians took pride in mouthing the simple syllogism, "it's the economy, stupid!" -- as if the only significant role of political leadership was to "grow the economy." Whether we like it or not -- whether we fully know it or not -- **this** entire worldview is subconsciously enlisted whenever we surrender to the use of market metaphors in devising public policy. It is no wonder that in this framework it is impossible to formulate effective environmental policy to protect biodiversity. Such a worldview arbitrarily restricts the notion of what is possible to what is profitable. Market metaphors truncate the range of policy options open to environmental leaders, and the vocabulary and images these metaphors generate completely fail to capture what we humans value most about our rich and complex world of everyday human experience. The insidious thought control exercised by market metaphors in the public discourse needs to be squarely confronted and firmly rejected. Only by stepping outside the make-believe world of these market metaphors is it possible to see why they mystify rather than clarify our environmental circumstance. Essentially, market metaphors are based on a logical fallacy that projects a fundamental falsification of reality. Despite frequent appeals to the "real world," market advocates live in a self-contained world of abstract modeling, statistical fantasies and paper currency that serves as a proxy measure of wealth. In fact, the real world is quite a different place, consisting of the physical parameters of all life forms that can be measured in terms of meters from sea-level, metric tons of gas emissions and degrees of temperature variation. The human economy needs to be understood as a subset of this physical ecosystem and not the other way around. Environmental policy based on an inverted representation of reality cannot help but fail in the long run. It is for this reason that economism -- the belief that principles of market economics can and should always be used to resolve environmental public policy dilemmas -- represents such a palpable failure of political leadership. Further, the attempt to substitute economism for meaningful public policy constitutes a blatant abdication of the public trust. This tragic abdication of the public trust through the relentless pursuit of economism has fueled the current righteous indignation of global citizens sensitive to the environment and concerned about the prospect of human survival. Politicians under the spell of economism fail to grasp what growing numbers of decent citizens sense and seek to affirm from a very deep level of conviction, and that is simply this: biodiversity must be saved for its intrinsic, expressive, and relational value -- not simply for the momentary advantage it may yield in some economist's cost-benefit calculations. If global policy makers do not free themselves from the trap of market mantras, their claim to leadership will be seen to be vacuous and illegitimate in the long run. This will be so because misplaced market metaphors cannot help but prove fatal in mediating human relationships with the environment. Taken together they have the power to drive industrial civilization into the sad syndrome of "overshoot-and-collapse" so often characteristic of failed economies of accumulation throughout human history. Unless radically different forms of valuation can be rediscovered, unless public leaders can learn to embrace and articulate them, and unless these leaders can then proceed to formulate effective public policy based on these new values to change collective human behavior, we will witness the demise of industrial society as the unavoidable outcome of "business as usual." In short, public leadership needs now to define, declare and defend the public good in terms that transcend private self-interest. There are no doubt connections between the public good and private gain, but to justify the former exclusively in terms of the latter is a fundamental mistake of moral reasoning. Without political leadership that can understand this fundamental difference and learn to defend the public good in its own right, industrial civilization will become irretrievably consumed in a scramble for private profit and personal advantage in a dismal world of diminishing resources. The Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, expressed this fear with a rivetting sense of urgency in his opening remarks at the Earth Summit Plus Five conference in New York.(6) Failure to act now could damage our planet irreversibly, unleashing a spiral of increased hunger, deprivation, disease and squalor. Ultimately, we could face the destabilising effects of conflict over vital natural resources....We must not fail. In past epochs individual religious and spiritual figures emerged to warn society of this kind of impending doom. Prophets of old inveighed against gluttonous consumption based on inequity and iniquity, and they warned societies of the physical consequences of failing to mend their ways. Perhaps more importantly, they served to remind societies of the natural order of the created world and the proper place for humankind within it. Amos, Jesus of Nazareth and Mohammed of Medina all arose in the ancient near east with strikingly parallel messages in this regard. Jews, Christians and Muslims to this day retain scriptural traditions which remind them that the earth does not ultimately belong to humans, nor will their mistreatment of the earth or their fellow creatures go unpunished. In these religious traditions arrogant, self-centered behavior with regard to the created order is thought to be morally wrong, however expedient or profitable it may prove to be for individuals in the short run. We are not fully informed by the preserved text, but one suspects that selling pigeons in the temple prompted a sense of moral indignation on the part of Jesus of Nazareth, not because the prices were a bit too high. Rather such activity inspired moral outrage because selling pigeons in the temple involved a fundamental confusion of the market place with sacred space. It is -- perhaps not surprisingly -- the scientists who speak with the prophetic voice of conviction in our day. Physicists like Nobel Laureate Henry Kendall, the late astronomer Carl Sagan, the evolutionary biologist Edward Wilson and renowned "public" scientists like the late oceanographer Jacques Cousteau now provide us with the clarion call to awareness and action that parallels the prophetic message of old. In a document entitled World Scientists' Warning to Humanity the Union of Concerned Scientists representing more than one hundred Nobel laureates put the message quite plainly:(7) Human beings and the natural world are on a collision course. Human activities inflict harsh and often irreversible damage on the environment and on critical resources. If not checked, many of our current practices put at serious risk the future that we wish for human society and the plant and animal kingdoms, and may so alter the living world that it will be unable to sustain life in the manner that we know. Fundamental changes are urgent if we are to avoid the collision our present course will bring about. It is hard to image a more thorough embodiment of the ancient prophetic tradition. Nevertheless, economists and politicians -- the scribes and Pharisees of our day -- do not yet seem to have understood the point. It is not that their prices are inaccurate -- goodness knows we have some of the world's most clever economists and accountants devoted to the task of assigning nature its cash value. We cannot expect much better on this score. But the issue before us is more fundamental than this. The essential problem is that to approach the issue of biodiversity as if it were an exercise in global bean-counting is fundamentally wrongheaded. It is wrong because it mistakes price for value, proffering market valuations as a proxy surrogate for a meaningful discussion of values. In such a constricted framework there can never be a purposeful debate -- only a mindless, mechanical and endless set of calculations. Given the two-year time frame of the electoral cycle and the pressures to craft policy to please rich and influential interest groups, there are powerful and evident reasons why politicians may well wish to avoid meaningful discussions about values and the environment. In this sense, the alliance between economists and politicians is a marriage of considerable convenience for both partners, but it must be made clear to each of them that this is not acceptable as a mode of public leadership. On this point, scientists and spiritual leaders agree, and it is for this reason that they have joined forces in such impressive numbers to express themselves in terms of the moral obligations facing the human community. The Union of Concerned Scientists has joined with the National Religious Partnership for the Environment to reiterate the prophetic message in churches, temples and mosques across the country and around the world. In a similar vein, research scientists at Harvard have provided strong support for the activities of the Harvard Seminar on Environmental Values convened by the University's Committee on Environment and the Center for the Study of Values in Public Life in order specifically to explore the full range of valuation -- not just economic costs -- which can be drawn upon in developing public policy to protect the environment and biodiversity. The message from spiritual leaders and research scientists alike is as clear as it is forceful: we did not create the world; we cannot control it; we must not destroy it. More precisely: we must not commodify and merchandise biodiversity merely because in the short run it may appear profitable for us to do so. Convinced that we know the price of everything we will soon have lost the ability to value anything that is priceless. The capacity to value some things and human experiences beyond all measure of worldly worth and to esteem them without any thought of their exchange value or sale is surely one of the most cherished attributes that makes us human. To forget this or deny it is to disavow our humanity, and down that road lies our swift and certain extinction. The capacity to appreciate intrinsic value is not a quality of humanity that it would be wise to denigrate, dismiss or eliminate in formulating environmental public policy. On the contrary, it may well constitute our last, best hope for survival as a species.

#### Neoliberalism has cloaked social injustice to undercut action based on shared responsibility

Giroux 3-20

Professor @ McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department

Henry, “Gated Intellectuals and Ignorance in Political Life: Toward a Borderless Pedagogy in the Occupy Movement,” http://truth-out.org/opinion/item/8009-gated-intellectuals-and-ignorance-in-political-life-toward-a-borderless-pedagogy-in-the-occupy-movement

Neoliberalism or market fundamentalism as it is called in some quarters and its army of supporters cloak their interests in an appeal to "common sense," while doing everything possible to deny climate change, massive inequalities, a political system hijacked by big money and corporations, the militarization of everyday life and the corruption of civic culture by a consumerist and celebrity-driven advertising machine. The financial elite, the 1 percent and the hedge fund sharks have become the highest-paid social magicians in America. They perform social magic by making the structures and power relations of racism, inequality, homelessness, poverty and environmental degradation disappear. And in doing so, they employ deception by seizing upon a stripped-down language of choice, freedom, enterprise and self-reliance - all of which works to personalize responsibility, collapse social problems into private troubles and reconfigure the claims for social and economic justice on the part of workers, poor minorities of color, women and young people as a species of individual complaint. But this deceptive strategy does more. It also substitutes shared responsibilities for a culture of diminishment, punishment and cruelty. The social is now a site of combat, infused with a live-for-oneself mentality and a space where a responsibility toward others is now gleefully replaced by an ardent, narrow and inflexible responsibility only for oneself. When the effects of structural injustice become obscured by a discourse of individual failure, human misery and misfortune, they are no longer the objects of compassion, but of scorn and derision. In recent weeks, we have witnessed Rush Limbaugh call Georgetown law student Sandra Fluke a "slut" and "prostitute"; US Marines captured on video urinating on the dead bodies of Afghanistan soldiers; and the public revelation by Greg Smith, a Goldman Sachs trader, that the company was so obsessed with making money that it cheated and verbally insulted its own clients, often referring to them as "muppets."(2) There is also the mass misogyny of right-wing extremists directed against women's reproductive rights, which Maureen Dowd rightly calls an attempt by "Republican men to wrestle American women back into chastity belts."(3) These are not unconnected blemishes on the body of neoliberal capitalism. They are symptomatic of an infected political and economic system that has lost touch with any vestige of decency, justice and ethics.

#### Turns the case – greatest comparative threat

Miah quoting West in 94

(Malik Miah, Cornel West's Race Matters, May-June, http://www.solidarity-us.org/node/3079)

In the chapter, “Nihilism in Black America,” West observes “The liberal/conservative discussion conceals the most basic issue now facing Black America: the nihilistic threat to its very existence. This threat is not simply a matter of relative economic deprivation and political powerlessness -- though economic well-being and political clout are requisites for meaningful Black progress. It is primarily a question of speaking to the profound sense of psychological depression, personal worthlessness, and social despair so widespread in Black America.” (12-13) “Nihilism,” he continues, “is to be understood here not as a philosophic doctrine ... it is, far more, the lived experience of coping with a life of horrifying meaningless, hopelessness, and (most important) lovelessness.” (14) “Nihilism is not new in Black America. . . . In fact,” West explains,”the major enemy of Black survival in America has been and is neither oppression nor exploitation but rather the nihilistic Threat -- that is, loss of hope and absence of meaning. For as long as hope remains and meaning is preserved, the possibility of overcoming oppression stays alive. The self-fulfilling prophecy of the nihilistic threat is that without hope there can be no future, that without meaning there can be no struggle.” (14-15)